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CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE: Point and Counterpoint
One of the objectives of the Critical Perspective feature is to draw the OJS readership into reflective thought about
current efforts in the natural and social sciences so that meaningful dialogue may ensue. That the essay "The Unnatural
Nature of the Animal Rights/Liberation Philosophy" reached this objective is demonstrated by the following letter from
Nate Cardarelli, professor emeritus from The University of Akron. We thought it would be beneficial to the OJS readership
to publish Professor Cardarelli's letter and a response from Drs. Nicoll and Russell, the authors of the original Critical
Perspective.
LEE A. MESERVE
Editor, OJS
To the Editor:
The recent article by Nicoll and Russell (1993), "The
Unnatural Nature of the Animal Rights/Liberation
Philosophy," while its conclusions echo my own senti-
ments, arrives there through highly refutable statements
and rather tortured logic. The animal rights activists have
become increasingly obstructive to the pursuit of medical
research, especially now that they have friends in high
places and thus ready access to the coercive powers of the
federal government. In refuting the ALARMists (using the
authors' acronym) one ought not to base their arguments
on anthropomorphic absurdities. The authors quote a
number of beliefs arising from murky theological tradi-
tions and doctrines. They state: "As far as we can ascertain,
only humans have language, the capacity to reason, and
a conscious, and only Homo sapiens have developed
moral codes. In addition, we are the only species that
shows any concern about the welfare of foreign species."
Beyond the fact that one can never prove a negative,
there is an immense compendium of data, not only from
the anecdotal literature, but in the published reports of
numerous reputable men of science, that refutes all of the
above statements (Krebs 1990).
My present research focuses on social bonding among
dogs and between dog and man. Anyone who has
worked with the canidae knows that they encode and
decode acoustic signals from conspecifics and alter their
behavior accordingly—which I believe is the basic thrust
of the common meaning of language. (Canids, like hu-
mans, also communicate by body language and exchange
olfactory pheromones. Hall and Sharp (1978) present sub-
stantial data in this respect. Communication is essential to
survival in numerous species (Griffin 1981), a truism aptly
explained some time ago by Darwin (1872) and Espinas
(1878). Man's inability to decode the language of other
species does not mean that conspecifics can't decode
(Payne 1989, Stebbins 1983). Even skeptics tread warily in
any universal negation of the presence of language in
other species (Wade 1980). Nonhuman species cannot
speak as we do because they lack the physiological
apparatus (Lieberman 1984). Obviously there are humans
who have not lost their humanity because they lacked the
ability to speak and/or to hear. Certainly animals can
decode human words, and apparently learn human sign
language (Fouts and Budd 1979, Linden 1974). Many
species, canids included, transmit in the infra- and
ultrasound areas not detectable by the human ear (Stebbins
1983), and literally no research has been done in that area
of communication.
Similarly the reasoning ability of nonhumans is hardly
open to question. There is no way that man can define
reason as only an attribute of man without tautology.
Numerous species show comprehension of symbols
(Davenport et al. 1975, Griffin 1992, Diamond 1990,
demonstrate cognitive mapping (Tolman 1948), and show
every aspect or quality of reasoning as defined by man.
Furthermore, at least the vertebrate social animals have
culture, by any nontautological definition, and also transfer
culture intergenerationally (Galef 1976; Griffin 1984,1992;
Haldane 1956; Mundinger 1980). Numerous species make
and use tools as part of their culture (Beck 1980), thus one
can't use "tools" as a distinction between humans and
nonhumans.
There is considerable literature on the universality of
consciousness, at least among the higher phyla. The
recent works of Humphrey (1992) and Griffin (1992), and
the article of Kihlstrom (1987) are recommended reading
for nonbelievers. Whatever does it even mean to say that
a living creature lacks consciousness—which, I presume,
means an awareness of self? And how could you ever
know? Suppose I deny that you have consciousness—let's
see you prove otherwise—using some method or argument
that would distinguish you from a dog.
It is also rather obvious that many species have some
sort of a moral code. Among the social mammals and
birds, one notes parental altruism towards the young, a
general cannibalism taboo, and both kin and nonkin
cooperation in the rearing of the young. Both male and
female social canids protect the "sanctity" of the mating
bond. Care of the sick and injured, and even altruistic
euthanasia is observed with wolf, coyote, and other
canines. One can infer a moral code in the wolf from the
various rituals, protection of the copulatory tie, group
feeding and defense, generalized reciprocal altruism, and
the like (Fox 1969, Fiennes 1976, Harrington et al. 1982,
Huxley 1897, Lopez 1978, Mech 1970).
Contrary to the claims of Nicoll and Russell, we observe
cooperation, compassion, and morality operating across
species boundaries. The naive altruism expressed daily
by the domestic dog towards humans is rather well
know. A dog that enters and rescues a strange infant from
a burning house, or saves a stranger from drowning is
hardly news.
Cooperation across species is well documented and
goes far beyond dog and man. There are a number of
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anecdotal reports from the American west on wild
canines, wolf and coyote, succoring man in need.
Reciprocity between man and the honey guide bird,
Indicator indicator(Krebs 1990, Isack and Reyer 1989) is
a well known illustration. Cooperative hunting, prey
sharing, and play after dining, are known for such pair-
ings as wolf and raven, coyote and badger, jackal and
cheetah, and domestic dog and domestic cat. In a
forthcoming book I will describe the continuing com-
passionate behavior of one of my experimental dogs
towards play-traumatized frogs!
There are a number of other challengeable assertions
made in the Nicoll and Russell article. The curious
argument that "the concepts of rights is an invention of
the human mind that can only be understood by rational,
reasoning beings"—and is not applicable to those that
don't have such a concept is rather fatuous. Am I to be-
lieve that such a concept therefore does not run to human
infants and children, the mentally incapacitated, and so
on? However, since at least the social canids show
reasoning and rationality, have a putative moral code
governing social behavior, and certainly recognize rights
and responsibilities to the group; am I then to argue that
we must accord them the same rights as due humans? The
ALARMists 'would certainly agree to that! The authors, in
discussing pain, assert that "it is not possible for us to
know what animals perceive." Those suffering from the
"Bambi syndrome," our ALARMist protagonists, would
counter that one cannot know what their fellow human
beings perceive in regard to pain—and they would be
right. The only pain perceptions one can know are his
own. Try explaining a headache to one who has never
experienced it!
In closing, I want to repeat that while I wholeheart-
edly endorse the need for using animals in research, and
the collateral need for justification of this need to the lay
audience, the subject article seems to provide comfort to
our protagonists. We need a rational argument for the
necessity of using animals in research; that is not attained
by dredging up ancient, logically fallacious and factually
incorrect arguments in support of our position as scientists.
NATE CARDARELLI, M.S.
Professor Emeritus
Division of Engineering and Science Technology
The University of Akron
Akron, OH 44325-6104
LITERATURE CITED
Beck, B. 1980 Animal Tool Behavior: The Use and Manufacture of Tools
by Animals. Garland, New York, NY.
Darwin, C. 1872 (1955) Expressions of the Emotions. Philosophical
Library, New York, NY.
Davenport, R. K., C. M. Rogers, and I. S. Russell 1975 Cross-model
perception in apes: Altered visual cues and delay. Neuro Psychologica
13: 229-235.
Diamond, J. 1991 Art of the wild. Discover 12: 79-85.
Espinas, A. V. 1878 Des Societe Animales. Librairie Germer Bailliere,
Paris.
Fiennes, R. 1976 The Order of Wolves. Bobbs-Merrill, New York, NY.
Fouts, R. S. and R. L. Budd. 1979 Artificial and human language
acquisition in the chimpanzee. In: D. A. Hamburg and E. R. McCown
(eds.), The Great Apes, Benjamin/Cummings, Menlo Park, CA.
pp. 375-393.
Fox, M. W. 1969 The anatomy of aggression and its ritualization in
Canidae: A developmental and comparative study. Behav. 35: 242-
258.
Galef, B. G. 1976 Social transmission of acquired behavior: A discussion
of tradition and social learning in vertebrates. Adv. Study Behav. 6:
77-100.
Griffin, D. 1981 The Question of Animal Awareness. Rockefeller Univ.
Press, New York, NY.
Griffin, D. R. 1984 Animal Thinking. Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge,
MA.
1992 Animal Minds. Univ. Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
Haldane, J. B. S. 1956 The argument from animals to men: An
examination of its validity for anthropology. J. Roy. Anthrop. Inst. Gt.
Brit. Irel. 36: 1-14.
Hall, R. L. and H. S. Sharp 1978 Communication and cognition. In: R.
L. Hall and H. S. Sharp (eds.).Wolf and Man: Evolution in Parallel.
Academic Press, New York, NY. pp. 81-93
Harrington, F. H., P. C. Paquet, J. Ryon, and J. C. Fentress 1982
Monogamy in wolves: A review of the evidence. In: F. H. Harrington
and P. C. Paquet (eds.),Wolves of the World, Noyes Pub., Park Ridge,
NJ. pp. 209-222
Humphrey, N. 1992 A History of the Mind. Simon and Schuster, New
York, NY.
Huxley, T. H. 1897 Evolution and ethics. In: D. Appleton, Evolution
and Ethics and Other Essays, New York, NY. pp. 46-116
Isack, H. A. and H. U. Reyer 1989 Honeyguides and honey gatherers:
Interspecific communication in a symbiotic relationship. Science
243: 1343-1346.
Kihlstrom, J. F. 1987 The cognitive unconsciousness. Science 237:1445-
1452.
Krebs, J. 1990 Animal language. In: H. Barlow, C. Blakemore, and M.
Weston-Smith(eds.), Images and Understanding. Cambridge Univ.
Press, New York, NY.
Lieberman, P. 1984 The Biology and Evolution of Language. Harvard
Univ. Press, Cambridge MA.
Linden, E. 1974 Apes, Men and Languages. Penguin, New York, NY.
Lopez, B. H. 1978 Of Wolves and Men. Charles Scribner's Sons, New
York, NY.
Mech, L. D. 1970 The Wolf. Natural History Press, Garden City, NY.
Mundinger, P. C. 1980 Animal cultures and a general theory of cultural
evolution. Ethol. Sociobiol. 1: 183-223.
Payne, K. 1989 Elephant talk. Nat. Geog. 176: 264-277.
Stebbins, W. C. 1983 The Acoustic Sense of Animals. Harvard Univ.
Press, Cambridge, MA.
Tolman, E. 1948 Cognitive maps in rats and men. Psychol. Rev. 55: 189-
208.
Wade, N. 1980 Does man alone have language? Apes reply in riddles
and a horse says neigh. Science 208: 1349-1351.
To the Editor:
We do not agree with Professor Nate Cardarelli's
assessment that our arguments against the philosophy of
the ALARMists are based on "anthropomorphic absurdi-
ties" and are "fatuous." First, he misunderstood one of the
terms that we used. We stated, in effect, that we are
unaware of any evidence that any nonhuman animals
have a conscience (i.e., a sense or understanding of the
difference between right and wrong behavior). We did
not state that only humans are conscious (i.e., aware of
their existence, surroundings, sensations, etc.)
Professor Cardarelli also misunderstood the meaning of
the sentence that he quoted and the paragraph from which
it was extracted. We stated:"... humans are morally more
'relevant' than animals because of the sum of a number of
attributes, rather than on the basis of one or a few." Some
of these attributes include language and the capacity to
reason and the possession of a conscience and the ability
to develop moral codes and showing concern for the
welfare of other species, etc.
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Yes, most or all animals can communicate with others
by one means or another (even plants and yeast cells
release chemical signals), but no species of which we are
aware has developed communication skills that remotely
resemble those of humans, which are characterized by
comparatively huge vocabularies and the development of
grammar and syntax. For which other species is there
evidence for an oral history, much less a written one?
Yes, some animals may have a limited capacity to
reason, but we are not convinced by the evidence pre-
sented by Professor Cardarelli that nonhuman animals
have codes of morality. The animal behavior that he cited
can all be accounted for by instincts and learning that do
not require an understanding of the differences between
right and wrong. The examples of cross-species coopera-
tion and sharing and of reciprocity say nothing about
animals having developed moral codes or laws regarding
the welfare and treatment of other species. These arguments
are anthropomorphic.
Professor Cardarelli also misunderstood the meaning
of the word "rights" as we have used it. The legal defi-
nition of that word is "that to which one has a just claim"
(see Cohen 1986, Nicoll and Russell 199D- Human infants
and the mentally handicapped do not in fact have all the
rights that are accorded to fully competent adults. If the
above definition of rights were applied in its strictest
sense, then infants and the mentally incompetent would
have no rights at all because they could not claim them.
However, society gives these groups special consideration
because of their special status, i.e. infants are developing
humans and mentally retarded or brain-damaged humans
have suffered a tragic loss. Applying special considera-
tion to special human cases in no way requires that, to be
consistent, we must extend rights to members of species
which have no understanding of them. (Contrary to
Professor Cardarelli's assertion, there is no evidence to
suggest that canids "recognize rights and responsibilities"
in the same way that humans do.) Moreover, no mentally
competent human has the right to abuse or neglect other
humans, whether or not they are mentally competent
themselves, just as no one has the right to abuse or neglect
animals for no purpose. A fuller discussion of the mean-
ing of rights can be found in the essay by Cohen (1986).
Finally, and most importantly, Professor Cardarelli has
completely missed the major point of our essay, which
was described in the last section, headed "Missing the
Point." It does not matter to what extent any animals share
some of the human attributes that we hold in high regard,
such as communication skills, reasoning ability, or even
"putative moral codes." Because we are like other animals,
we must use whatever means we have to ensure our
survival as individuals and as a species. If our adaptive
advantages are curtailed, we will face early extinction. It
is ludicrous to moralize about biological necessities. We
recommend that Professor Cardarelli read the last section
of our essay again.
CHARLES S. NICOLL, PH.D.
Professor
SHARON M. RUSSELL, PH.D.
Research Physiologist
Department of Integrative Biology
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, CA 94720
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